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ABSTRACT 
 
This study extends the stock market liberalisation literature by conducting a firm-level 
analysis on the emerging economy of Malaysia. Using a finer measure of foreign 
ownership, we explore the association between liberalisation and cost of equity for public 
listed firms on Bursa Malaysia over the sample period of 2002-2009. We find strong 
support for our hypothesis that total foreign ownership is negatively and significantly 
associated with cost of equity. Further disaggregate analysis suggests foreign institutions 
that trade through direct accounts are driving the lower cost of equity. When the model is 
extended to include interaction term, we find that an effective board of directors further 
strengthens the negative relationship between foreign institutions and cost of equity. Our 
empirical results consistently support the corporate governance channel in which foreign 
institutions play an active monitoring role.  
 
Keywords: foreign ownership, cost of equity, investor heterogeneity, corporate 
governance, Malaysia 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s for 
emerging market economies is the gradual removal of restrictions on cross-border 
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financial transactions, which include the opening of stock markets for foreign 
investors to purchase shares of publicly listed companies. To provide policy 
feedback, academicians have conducted thousands of studies to evaluate the 
associated costs and benefits of financial liberalisation, especially in the context 
of emerging markets (see the survey papers by Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; 
Kearney, 2012). We find that economic growth constitutes the largest portion of 
this voluminous literature (see the survey papers by Henry, 2007; Kose, Prasad, 
Rogoff, & Wei, 2009). However, the empirical evidence on its growth benefits is 
still inconclusive, triggering vigorous discussions on the desirability of full 
financial liberalisation. To reconcile the literature, Henry (2007) advocates a 
departure from the broad capital account liberalisation to a narrow focus on stock 
market liberalisation.  
 
 In empirical analysis, it is crucial for researchers to choose the best proxy 
for stock market liberalisation. Chang (2012) provides a summary of existing 
indicators for stock market liberalisation, which we reproduce his Table 1 in this 
paper. The author also provides a lengthy discussion on these indicators, and 
advocates the use of foreign ownership in empirical research of stock market 
liberalisation. We hereby summarise the extensive review of Chang (2012). The 
first generation of papers focuses on developing systematic methods to date the 
openings of emerging stock markets. However, official stock market opening 
dates might not be able to fully capture the liberalisation effect because the 
removal of individual restrictions in many developing countries takes place 
gradually over several years or even decades. As a result, the literature witnesses 
the development of continuous indicators to capture the extent and evolution of 
stock market liberalisation over time. However, the above de jure measures have 
been criticised in favour of de facto indicators because the law is insufficient in 
deterring/attracting capital flows (see references cited in Chang, 2012). In the 
first case, many countries have strict capital controls but still report large 
portfolio equity flows, mainly because of weak law enforcement. In the second 
scenario, there are countries that struggle to attract equity inflows because foreign 
investors take into account indirect investment barriers apart from an open stock 
market. 
 
 According to Chang (2012),	the use of aggregate country-level measures 
in Table 1 may underestimate the effect of stock market liberalisation. In the 
category of de jure measures, even if firms in a liberalised economy are free from 
country-level restrictions, they are still subject to corporate bylaws, corporate 
charters or industry limitations on foreign investment. The same applies to de 
facto aggregate measures, since it is possible for small-size public listed firms to 
have zero foreign ownership despite the country receives large equity inflows. At 
the firm-level, the de facto foreign ownership is more appealing relative to the de 
jure investable weight because the latter is based not only on the statutory limits 
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on foreign ownership, but also the screening criteria of minimum size and 
liquidity (for details, see Li, Nguyen, Pham, & Wei, 2011). In fact, Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000) acknowledge that foreign ownership is the best indicator because 
it measures the actual presence of foreign investors across different firms within 
the same country over time. 
 
Table 1 
Existing indicators for stock market liberalisation 
 
 De jure indicator De facto indicator 
Country level 1. Official stock market opening 
dates 
(Bekaert & Harvey, 2000; Henry, 
2000; Kim & Singal, 2000) 
2. Degree of stock market openness 
(Edison & Warnock, 2003; 
Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2008; 
Schindler, 2009). 
Investable weight 
(Standard & Poor's Emerging 
Markets Database) 
Firm level 
 
1. Portfolio equity flows 
(International Financial Statistics, 
IMF) 
2. Stocks of portfolio equity assets 
and liabilities 
(Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) 
Foreign ownership 
 
Source: Chang (2012) 
 
This paper extends the stock market liberalisation literature by conducting a firm-
level analysis on the emerging economy of Malaysia using foreign ownership. 
The Malaysian stock exchange presents an interesting case study because the 
participation of foreign investors has been a subject of policy concern since the 
country gained independence in 1957. Among the developing economies, 
Malaysia is one of the earliest that actively pursued financial liberalisation, which 
could be traced back to as early as 1970 (for details, see Chang, 2012). Further 
opening up of the stock market has been undertaken in the 2000s, with more 
sweeping changes in June 2009, all aim to boost foreign investments and put 
Bursa Malaysia on the radar screen of international fund managers. From the 
foreign ownership statistics tabulated by Chang (2012) covering all stocks listed 
on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2002-2009, foreign investors hold around 15% 
of the total outstanding shares in the local stock exchange. It is expected that the 
foreign shareholdings will increase following further liberalisation of the stock 
market in June 2009. 
 
 Despite the active participation of foreign investors in the local stock 
market, Chang (2012) highlights the lack of published Malaysian study that 
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examines the effects brought by the relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions. 
Instead, the author finds that foreign investors have been subject to intense 
scrutiny in other Asian stock markets, and he provides a summary discussion of 
those selected studies for China (Chan, Menkveld, & Yang, 2007; Gul, Kim, & 
Qiu, 2010), Indonesia (Dvor̆ák, 2005; Agarwal, Faircloth, Liu, & Rhee, 2009), 
Japan (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Bae, Yamada, & Ito, 2006), Korea (Kim & Wei, 
2002; Choe, Kho, & Stulz, 2005), Sri Lanka (Samarakoon, 2009, 2010), Taiwan 
(Chen, Johnson, Lin, & Liu, 2009; Huang & Shiu, 2009), and Thailand (Bailey & 
Jagtiani, 1994; Bailey, Mao, & Sirodom, 2007). The main reason, according to 
Lim, Hooy, Chang and Brooks (2016), is the absence of complete Malaysian 
ownership data from listed companies’ annual reports or commercial databases. 
These authors are able to obtain the commercial ownership data “End of Year 
Shareholdings by Type of Investor”, which permits them to pioneer the research 
on foreign investors in Bursa Malaysia. Lim et al. (2016), among others, find that 
foreign investors who trade through nominee accounts are elite processors of 
public market-wide and firm-specific news in the Malaysian stock market. In a 
companion study, Lim, Thian and Hooy (2015) find that the relationship between 
total foreign ownership and stock liquidity is non- monotonic, suggesting that the 
improvement in liquidity reverses when foreign shareholdings exceed the 
threshold level. Both studies report insignificant results for foreign institutions 
and foreign individual investors who trade through direct accounts, suggesting 
that foreign nominees are playing important informational and liquidity roles in 
the Malaysian stock market. 
 
 The objective of this study is to complement the pioneering work of Lim 
et al. (2015, 2016) to provide more policy feedback on the participation of 
foreign investors in Bursa Malaysia. We explore the relationship between foreign 
ownership and cost of equity, as the latter is the focus area of those first 
generation stock market liberalisation papers (Bekaert & Harvey, 2000; Henry, 
2000; Kim & Singal, 2000). Their interest is motivated by the theoretical 
prediction of neoclassical model, in which stock market liberalisation is expected 
to cause a permanent fall in the cost of equity, with the attendant effects on 
aggregate investment and economic growth (for details, see Henry, 2003, 2007). 
The above-cited studies infer the reduction of cost of capital from stock price 
increases because both are inversely related, or changes in dividend yields via the 
present value model. For example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) address the impact 
of liberalisation on the cost of capital in 20 emerging markets. They document an 
average fall in dividend yields of 5 to 75 basis points after liberalisations, which 
is interpreted as a drop in the cost of capital. Henry (2000) reports an abnormal 
return associated with liberalisation as high as 3.3% per month in real dollar term 
for 12 emerging equity market indices. Kim and Singal (2000) record a sharp rise 
in stock prices after the opening of 20 emerging markets. The literature on stock 
market integration also predicts, via international asset pricing models, that when 
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a local market becomes more integrated with the world markets, it brings about 
an improvement in risk sharing and thus contributes to the reduction of the cost 
of capital (see Errunza & Miller, 2000; de Jong & de Roon, 2005). 
 
 Our research framework differs from those first generation stock market 
liberalisation papers in four significant ways. First, Edison and Warnock (2003) 
argue that the degree of stock market openness should be taken into account 
when evaluating the impact of liberalisation on cost of capital. Our use of de 
facto firm-level measure addresses this concern because foreign ownership 
captures the actual presence of foreign institutional investors across different 
firms within the same country over time. Second, instead of using long time-
series of ex-post realised stock returns or dividend yields, we follow recent 
literature to compute ex-ante cost of equity from stock prices and expected future 
cash flows implied in analyst forecast data. Hail and Leuz (2006) argue that 
changes in realised return or dividend yield not only capture differences in cost of 
capital, but they can be driven by shocks to firms' growth opportunities or 
changes in expected growth rates. Mishra and O'Brien (2005) contend that ex-
ante expected return is a more direct measure than realised return because risk-
return theory relates to ex ante expectation and not to realised return. Moreover, 
prior studies (see for example, Fama and French, 1997; Elton, 1999) suggest that 
historical realised return is a poor proxy for expected return due to imprecise 
estimates of factor risk premium and risk loading, and thus affect the cost of 
equity estimates indirectly. Third, with the use of firm-level data, we are able to 
explore the moderating role of board characteristics in the foreign ownership-cost 
of equity relationship. Last but not least, the Bursa ownership dataset allows us to 
address within-country foreign investor heterogeneity, given that the existing 
literature generally treats foreign investors as a homogeneous group or focuses 
solely on foreign institutions.  
 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Even though our literature survey is unable to find published study that examines 
the direct link between foreign ownership and cost of equity, there are empirical 
findings to support a lower cost of equity attributable to foreign participation 
through the channels of strong corporate governance and higher stock liquidity.  
 
 It is well-established that effective corporate governance helps to reduce 
agency problem by protecting the interests of minority shareholders from self-
serving managerial behavior. One effective mechanism is through credible 
information disclosure that improves financial reporting quality and mitigates 
information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders. The extant 
theoretical models predict that investors demand lower expected returns on their 
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equity capital for firms with lower monitoring cost of management (Lombardo & 
Pagano, 2002), higher quality of accounting information (Lambert, Leuz, & 
Verrechia, 2007) and increased public disclosure of information (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991). These theoretical predictions receive strong empirical support 
as evidence shows that firms with greater corporate disclosure (Francis, Khurana, 
& Pereira, 2005; Botosan, 2006; Fu, Kraft, & Zhang, 2012) and improved 
corporate governance (Cheng, Collins, & Huang, 2006; Guedhami & Mishra, 
2009; Zhu, 2014) are associated with lower cost of equity. Notably, the recent 
survey paper by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) on corporate governance 
acknowledges the above cost of equity benefit for emerging market firms. 
Another strand of literature explores the link between foreign ownership and 
corporate governance. Covrig, De Fond and Hung (2007), Leuz, Lins and 
Warnock (2009) and Kim, Eppler-Kim, Kim and Byun (2010), among others, 
find that firms with strong governance indicators attract more equity participation 
from foreign investors. The latter have been found by Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
to engage in monitoring firms worldwide and thus reduce agency risk. Aggarwal, 
Erel, Ferreira and Matos (2011) show that foreign institutional investors play an 
active role in improving corporate governance mechanisms and outcomes. An 
(2015) finds that foreign investors improve the reporting quality of Korean firms 
through their active monitoring role that mitigates managerial opportunism. 
Putting the two research streams into perspective, we can infer that foreign 
investors promote good corporate governance of their invested firms, which in 
turn lead to lower cost of equity financing. 
 
 Apart from the channel of corporate governance, foreign participation is 
hypothesised to improve stock liquidity which translates into a lower cost of 
equity capital. In the theoretical model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), public 
disclosure of information reduces the cost of equity because the former improves 
the liquidity of a firm's securities. Empirically, Lang, Lins and Maffett (2012) 
confirm liquidity is a significant channel through which greater transparency is 
associated with lower cost of equity capital for their international sample of firms 
from 46 countries. The direct path from liquidity to cost of equity is first 
established by the theoretical model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who 
predict that cost of equity is higher for securities with wider bid-ask spreads 
because risk-averse investors demand higher expected returns as compensation 
for bearing illiquidity costs. Following their seminal work, the literature 
witnesses the development of liquidity-based asset pricing models (Acharya & 
Pedersen, 2005; Liu, 2006). Empirical evidence abounds showing expected stock 
returns fall with increases in liquidity, supporting illiquidity risk as a significant 
determinant for cost of equity (see references cited in Amihud and Mendelson, 
2000).  
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 Having established the link between stock liquidity and cost of equity, 
our literature search then explores the liquidity role of foreign investors. Previous 
papers generally find that stock market liberalisation improves stock liquidity 
(Levine & Zervos, 1998; Bekaert, Harvey, & Lumsdaine, 2002; Vagias & van 
Dijk, 2012). Given the increasing availability of quality firm-level data in 
emerging markets, a number of recent studies utilise direct foreign shareholdings 
when exploring the liquidity effect. Wei (2010) collects eight years of foreign 
institutional ownership from the FactSet/LionShares database for stocks traded in 
20 developed and 20 developing countries. His large sample result shows that 
stocks with increased foreign shareholdings exert a causal effect on domestic 
stock liquidity, and the improvement operates through enhanced competition 
among informed traders and greater liquidity trading. Ng, Wu, Yu and Zhang 
(2015) also address similar issue with an international coverage of 27,828 firms 
from 39 countries. The key result in Ng et al. (2015) consistently shows that 
foreign direct investors reduce liquidity in local equity markets, whereas foreign 
portfolio investors contribute significantly to liquidity improvement. For the 
Malaysian stock market, Lim et al. (2015) find that the relationship between total 
foreign ownership and stock liquidity is non-monotonic, suggesting that the 
improvement in liquidity reverses when foreign shareholdings exceed the 
threshold level. Since foreign investors are expected to improve stock liquidity, 
the theoretical and empirical studies predict a reduction in cost of equity for 
liquid stocks.  
 
 Building on the above literature, we state our first hypothesis in 
alternative form as follows:  
 
H1:  Firms with higher total foreign ownership have lower cost 
of equity.  
 
In the corporate governance channel, foreign investors have been found to play 
active monitoring role in their invested firms. However, the group of foreign 
investors in these empirical studies is confined to foreign institutions (see 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; An, 2015). In another strand of 
literature, the liquidity benefits documented by Wei (2010) and Ng et al. (2015) 
also come from foreign institutional investors. However, in the context of 
Malaysia, Lim et al. (2015, 2016) demonstrate the importance of incorporating 
foreign investor heterogeneity in which they disaggregate total foreign ownership 
into foreign institutions, foreign individuals, and foreign nominees. Both studies 
find that only the participation of foreign nominees improves the price efficiency 
and liquidity of Malaysian stocks. Given the unique Malaysian setting, we 
proceed with the second hypothesis: 
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H2: The foreign ownership-cost of equity relationship differs 
according to the types of foreign investors.  
 
If foreign ownership is negatively associated with cost of equity through the 
channel of corporate governance, then an effective board of directors should 
further strengthens this inverse relationship. More specifically, the board of 
directors plays an important role in monitoring and controlling managers' 
performance. The effects of various board characteristics on firm performance 
has been the subject of investigation in recent studies. For instance, empirical 
evidence shows that board independence has positive effect on firm performance 
(Li et al., 2015) whereas board size exerts negative impact (Liang, Xu, & 
Jiraporn, 2013). On the other hand, greater board activeness and board member's 
experience may suggest higher perceived monitoring ability of the board.  
 
H3:  An effective board of directors strengthens the negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and cost of equity. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Estimates of Implied Cost of Equity  
 
Earlier empirical research commonly uses ex-post realised stock return or 
dividend yield as proxies for cost of equity. As highlighted in Introduction, the 
above measures have been subjected to heavy criticism. It is now an accepted 
practice in the empirical literature to compute ex-ante cost of equity from current 
stock prices, future cash flows and growth potential of the firm. 
 
In the study, we use the ex-ante or implied cost of equity, which is 
assumed to be the true rate that discounts the present value of expected future 
cash flows per share equal to the share price of the firm. Our implied cost of 
equity estimate is based on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), identified by the 
subscript KOJ: 
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constant that is equal to 1 + long-term growth rate fixed at the nominal year 
Malaysia's inflation rate. 
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KOJ = cost of equity estimate of the model. 
PT = I/B/E/S market price at the statistics release date for the estimation 
year. 
DT+1 = I/B/E/S median dividend forecast for the tth year from the estimation 
year. 
FEPST+t  = I/B/E/S median earnings forecast. 
 
When examining the relationship between foreign ownership and cost of equity, 
we need to control for other cost of equity determinants to isolate the marginal 
effect of foreign ownership. These control variables are proven in previous 
studies to have significant influence on cost of equity. More specifically, we 
control for: (1) firm size (SIZE), measured by logarithm of total assets; (2) the 
book-to-market ratio (BM), calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity; (3) financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) as measured by the ratio of total debt to book value of total assets; 
(4) stock liquidity (LIQUIDITY), we follow Lesmond (2005) to calculate the 
proportion of non-zero returns days in the nominal year instead of bid-ask 
spreads as the latter are often not available for Malaysia and most emerging 
markets; (5) firm risk, represented by firm market beta (BETA) which is derived 
from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by regressing the weekly 
individual stock returns against the local market index within the nominal year; 
(6) analyst coverage (ANALYST), denoted by the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of analyst providing earnings forecasts for the firm; and last but not 
least (7) forecast bias (BIAS), defined as the medium forecasted earnings for the 
first year minus the actual earnings for the forecast date, and scaled by the 
former. 
 
Model Specification 
 
For H1 and H2, we formulate the following baseline model to determine the 
relationship between foreign ownership and cost of equity:  
 
it
J
j
itjjititOJ CONTROLFOK εβαα +++= ∑
=1
,10,
 (2) 
 
where the dependent variable KOJ,it is the implied cost of equity capital for firm i 
over time t. The key independent variable of foreign ownership is represented by 
the variable of FO. For H1, we enter total foreign ownership (Foreign) as the 
proxy for FO in the baseline model. For H2, FO is represented by foreign 
institutions (FInstitution), foreign individuals (FIndividual), and foreign nominees 
(FNominee), with each entering the model separately. The control variables are 
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SIZE, BM, LEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY, BETA, ANALYST, and BIAS 
representing firm size, book-to-market ratio, debt-to-equity ratio, proportion of 
non-zero returns, firm annual CAPM beta, analyst coverage, and earning forecast 
bias of analyst, respectively. The symbol of α represents the intercept whereas ε  
denotes the regression residual. 
 
 To determine the moderating role of board characteristics as stated in 
Hypothesis 3, we extend the baseline model to include an interaction term: 
 
( ), 0 1 , , ,
1 1 1 1
*
J K L K
OJ it it j j it k k it l it k it it
j k l k
K FO CONTROL BOARD FO BOARDα α β β β ε
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑            (3) 
 
where 
,
*
it k it
FO BOARD  accounts for the interaction effect of board characteristics 
on the relationship between foreign ownership and cost of equity.  
 
Data 
 
The ownership data for our empirical analysis come from Bursa Malaysia's "End 
of Year Shareholdings by Type of Investor" dataset. Share ownership is 
computed as the fraction of total shares outstanding held by each type of 
investors in each firm at year end. This formula is used to compute total foreign 
ownership (Foreign), foreign institutions (FInstitution), foreign individuals (FIndividual) 
and foreign nominees (FNominee).  
 
 We include five types of board characteristics in the model, namely CEO 
duality (Duality), board independency (BIndep), board size (BSize), board 
activeness (BActive) and board member's experience (BExp). The data for all 
five variables are extracted from the annual reports of our sample firms.  
 
 In terms of control variables, we download the data from Thomson 
Datastream for firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), debt-to-equity ratio 
(LEVERAGE). Datastream also provides the raw data required to compute stock 
liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and CAPM Beta (BETA). As standard in the literature, 
we obtain analysts data from Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for 
computing the implied cost of equity capital. The two control variables of analyst 
coverage (ANALYST) and earning forecast bias of analyst (BIAS) are also 
extracted from I/B/E/S. 
 
 The sample period for our study is from 2002 to 2009, mainly because 
this is the coverage for the "End of Year Shareholdings by Type of Investor" 
dataset. Lim et al. (2015, 2016) also cover similar time period in their analysis of 
price efficiency and liquidity for Malaysia stocks. However, our sample size is 
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smaller than the 600 firms in both studies. This is constrained by the 
unavailability of data for computing the implied cost of equity capital, which 
limits our sample size to 76 Malaysian firms. The descriptions for all the 
variables in this study are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Variable description 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Dependent Variables   
KOJ Implied cost of equity capital of Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) for firm i over time t. 
Control Variables  
Firm size (Size) Natural logarithm of total asset of firm i in year t. 
Financial Leverage (Leverage) Total debt over total asset of firm i in year t. 
Book-to-Market ratio (BM) Ratio of market to book value of equity of firm i in year 
t. 
Liquidity The proportion of non-zero daily returns days of firm i 
in year t 
Firm Risk (Risk) Firm market beta  
Analyst Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analyst 
providing earnings forecasts for firm i in year t. 
Bias Medium forecasted earnings for the first year minus the 
actual earnings for the forecast date, and scaled by the 
former for firm i in year t. 
Main Variables of Interest   
Foreign Percentage of total foreign ownership for firm i in year t.  
FInstitution Percentage of foreign institutional ownership for firm i in year t. 
FIndividual Percentage of foreign individual ownership for firm i in year t. 
FNominee Percentage of foreign nominee ownership for firm i in year t. 
Duality Dummy variable which equals to one if CEO and Board 
Chairman is the same person for firm i in year t. 
BIndep Percentage of independent directors on the board for 
firm i in year t. 
BActive Dummy variable which equals to one if all board 
members attend all board meetings for firm i in year t. 
BSize Total number of directors on the board for firm i in year 
t. 
BExp Dummy variable which equals to one if the average age 
of all board members exceeds 60 for firm i in year t. 
  
Note: This table describes all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. Our dependent 
variable, the implied cost of equity, has a mean of 15.54% with a standard 
deviation of 7.35% for the sample firms. Browsing through the existing cross-
country studies, Guedhami and Mishra (2009) report a lower implied cost of 
equity capital of 8.9% for 72 Malaysian firms in the year of 1996. Hail and Leuz 
(2006) record a higher 10.65% for Malaysian firms during their sample period of 
1992–2001. Our estimation indicates that the cost of equity has increased further 
to 15.54% over the next 8 years from 2002–2009. On the other hand, the key 
independent variable of total foreign ownership has a mean of 23.72%. 
Decomposing the types of foreign ownership into three categories, we find that 
foreign nominees has the highest percentage, with an average of 14.53%. The 
Malaysian case represents a unique institutional setting given that the largest 
foreign investor group in most stock markets is either foreign institutions or 
foreign individuals who trade through direct accounts. 
 
The correlations for all the variables are tabulated in Table 4. The first 
column represents univariate regression of implied cost of equity against all the 
explanatory variables. Against our prior expectation, our key independent 
variables of total foreign ownership (Foreign), foreign institutions (FInstitution) and 
foreign individuals (FIndividual) are positively associated with cost of equity. Only 
the variable of foreign nominees (FNominee) has the expected negative sign. 
However, it is premature to draw inference for our hypothesis based on the 
univariate analysis. As for the correlations between explanatory variables, Table 
4 shows that the values are all less than 0.5, and we thus rule out the concern of 
multicollinearity. The only exception is the correlation between Foreign and 
FInstitution, with their value of 0.78 indicates that both variables should not be 
included in the same model. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean 25 
percentile 
50 
percentile 
(Median) 
75 
percentile 
S.D. Min Max N 
KOJ 15.5414 11.0284 13.7295 18.4919 7.3480 4.5935 66.5306 412 
Size 14.5273 13.5282 14.3642 15.4007 1.3522 11.9289 18.0833 456 
Leverage 0.4182 0.2730 0.3981 0.5643 0.1847 0.0347 0.9158 456 
BM 0.9024 0.4608 0.7326 1.2122 0.6720 0.0303 5.0000 456 
Liquidity 67.9324 61.5385 69.6154 75.4789 10.5377 30.6513 87.4046 450 
Risk 0.9672 0.4821 0.8920 1.3561 0.6319 –0.6411 3.6895 450 
Analyst 2.1058 1.6094 2.0794 2.9444 0.9462 0.0000 3.8712 436 
Bias 0.5699 –0.1732 –0.0111 0.1699 12.5934 –14.4790 264.3333 453 
Foreign 0.2372 0.0521 0.1435 0.3446 0.2364 0.0024 0.8830 450 
FInstitution 0.0858 0.0002 0.0013 0.0126 0.1932 0.0000 0.7272 450 
FIndividual 0.0061 0.0012 0.0029 0.0080 0.0080 0.0002 0.0577 450 
FNominees 0.1453 0.0277 0.0954 0.1940 0.1581 0.0008 0.8813 450 
Duality 0.1709 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3770 0.0000 1.0000 316 
BIndep 0.4303 0.3333 0.4286 0.5000 0.1244 0.0000 0.8000 408 
BActive 0.1009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3015 0.0000 1.0000 456 
BSize 8.7917 7.0000 9.0000 10.0000 2.3299 4.0000 18.0000 408 
BExp 0.2566 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4372 0.0000 1.0000 456 
 
Note: The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in Table 2. 
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Foreign Ownership and Cost of Equity 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for our baseline model (2) to determine the 
relationship between foreign ownership and cost of equity capital. We pooled the 
firm data across the eight years to conduct OLS regression. To ensure robust 
statistical inferences, we follow the suggestion of Petersen (2009) to account for 
the presence of time and/or firm effect in the model through different treatments 
for the standard errors, namely firm-clustered (Column 1), time-clustered 
(Column 2), and double-clustered by firm and time (Column 3). Generally, we 
can see that the sign and magnitude of the estimates are stable across the different 
adjustments. This implies that within-cluster correlation does not affect our 
statistical inference, which is consistent with Lim et al. (2015, 2016) for a larger 
sample of Malaysian firms. More importantly, the consistent results across the 
different adjusted standard errors ensure robustness and increase confidence.  
 
 Adding further credence to our baseline results is the significance of the 
included control variables, which are important determinants for cost of equity in 
previous studies. With the exception of analyst coverage (ANALYST), all control 
variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 
conventional level. The insignificant role of ANALYST is consistent with Lim et 
al. (2015, 2016), which they attribute to the small number of security analysts 
covering Malaysian stocks.  Turning to our key variable of total foreign 
ownership (Foreign), Columns (1) to (3) consistently show that the variable is 
highly significant across different treatments of standard errors. The negative 
coefficient supports hypothesis H1, implying higher total foreign ownership is 
associated with lower cost of equity capital. Such benefit of foreign participation 
can be driven by their influences on corporate governance or stock liquidity.  
 
 When we decompose total foreign ownership according to investor type, 
Column (4) shows that only foreign institutions play a significant role in driving 
the lower cost of equity for Malaysian public listed firms, which supports the 
foreign investor heterogeneity hypothesis of H2. This runs contrary to the key 
result in Lim et al. (2015, 2016) as both studies find that only foreign investors 
who trade through nominee accounts contribute to higher price efficiency and 
stock liquidity of Malaysian stocks. We offer two explanations to rationalise 
these contradicting results. First, even though Lim et al. (2015) report an 
insignificant relationship between foreign institutional ownership and stock 
liquidity, the former can still affect cost of equity through the corporate 
governance channel. Second, Lim et al. (2015) find that the relationship between 
foreign nominee and stock liquidity is non-monotonic, suggesting that when the 
ownership level exceeds certain threshold, the documented positive liquidity 
effect becomes negative. Thus, if the shareholdings of foreign nominees are 
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large, the invested firms become illiquid and this increases the cost of equity. 
However, we do not observe a significant relationship between foreign nominees 
and cost of equity, possibly because they do not exert influence on the corporate 
governance process. In the Malaysian stock market, foreign nominees are 
ineligible to attend Annual General Meeting (AGM) and Authorised Nominees 
will monitor and manage corporate actions for securities kept in their custody. 
The active monitoring of management is expected to be taken up by foreign 
institutions who trade through direct accounts, and their large foreign 
shareholdings can lower cost of equity through the channel of corporate 
governance.  
 
Table 5 
Foreign ownership and cost of equity 
 
This table shows the regression result for the baseline model (2):  
it
J
j
itjjititOJ CONTROLFOK εβαα +++= ∑
=1
,10,
 
where CONTROLj,it includes Size, Leverage, BM, Liquidity, Risk, Analyst and Bias. In column 
(4), total foreign ownership (Foreign) is further divided into foreign institutions (FInstitution), 
foreign individuals (FIndividual) and foreign nominees (FNominee).
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 24.9537*** 24.9537*** 24.9537*** 26.9313*** 
 (5.6749) (5.2905) (6.7519) (8.0110) 
Size –0.7563* –0.7563** –0.7563* –0.8685* 
 (0.4126) (0.2625) (0.4087) (0.4454) 
Leverage 7.3654*** 7.3654*** 7.3654*** 7.3115*** 
 (2.4275) (1.1522) (1.7748) (1.8863) 
BM 3.1178*** 3.1178*** 3.1178*** 3.1073*** 
 (0.6315) (0.6964) (0.7418) (0.7782) 
Liquidity –0.1071* –0.1071* –0.1071* –0.1094 
 (0.0563) (0.0531) (0.0616) (0.0665) 
Risk 3.3785*** 3.3785** 3.3785*** 3.3628*** 
 (1.0748) (0.8793) (0.9967) (0.9542) 
Analyst 0.2105 0.2105 0.2105 0.1848 
 (0.5870) (0.6617) (0.7772) (0.7882) 
Bias 0.0277*** 0.0277** 0.0277*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0091) 
Foreign –3.4676** –3.4676*** –3.4676***  
 (1.6849) (0.4255) (1.2792)  FInstitution    –3.6564
* 
    (1.9306) 
FIndividual    –45.2357 
    (33.3482)  
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5: (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FNominee    –2.134     (2.6953) 
Firm Cluster Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Cluster No Yes Yes Yes 
N 394 394 394 394 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2372 0.2372 0.2372 0.2358 
 
Notes: The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in Table 2. The dependent variable is cost of 
equity (KOJ). Year dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. Figures in parentheses 
are standard errors with different adjustments namely firm-clustered, time-clustered, and double-clustered by 
firm and time. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	
Monitoring Role of Board Characteristics 
 
We now turn to the moderating effect of board characteristics on the relationship 
between foreign ownership and cost of equity. Since only the variable of foreign 
institutions is statistically significant in Table 5, we thus use FInstitution as a proxy 
for FO in Equation (3). Five types of board characteristics are introduced and 
entered into the model separately, namely CEO duality (Duality), board 
independency (BIndep), board size (BSize), board activeness (BActive) and 
board member’s experience (BExp).  
 
 Table 6 presents the estimation results for the extended model with an 
interaction term. Overall, our estimates are quite consistent with Table 5 for the 
control variables and foreign ownership. However, out of the five interaction 
terms, only CEO duality (Duality) and board independency (BIndep) are 
statistically significant at the conventional level. In the first case of CEO duality, 
foreign institutional investors perceive the combined positions of CEO and board 
chairman to have greater influence in pushing the corporate governance agenda. 
However, the interaction term of FInstitution × BIndep has larger negative 
coefficient and is highly significant at the 1% level. This indicates that when the 
ratio of independent directors in a board is higher, the board has a better 
monitoring role in reducing agency problem. Both sets of results suggest that an 
effective board of directors further strengthens the relationship between foreign 
institutions and cost of equity, consistent with hypothesis H3. This also lends 
support to our earlier conjecture that foreign institutions who trade through direct 
accounts can lower the cost of equity through the channel of corporate 
governance. 
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Table 6 
Moderating role of board characteristics 
 
This table shows the regression result for the extended model (3):  
, 0 1 , ,
1 1
,
1 1
*
J K
Institution
OJ it it j j it k k it
j k
L K
Institution
l it k it it
l k
K F CONTROL BOARD
F BOARD
α α β β
β ε
= =
= =
= + + + +
+
∑ ∑
∑∑
 
where CONTROLj,it  includes Size, Leverage, BM, Liquidity, Risk, Analyst and Bias. The 
variable of BOARDk,it is proxied by Duality, BIndep, BActive, BSize and BExp, each entering 
the model separately. 
 
Duality Independence Activeness Size Experience 
Constant 30.2742*** 22.1606*** 42.9115*** 25.9463*** 24.4179*** 
 
(4.6541) (4.1514) (11.3465) (3.9968) (3.8642) 
Size –1.0047*** –0.7351*** –1.3187*** –0.9054*** –0.7024** 
 
(0.3146) (0.2678) (0.3072) (0.2809) (0.2857) 
Leverage 8.5386*** 8.9373*** 6.6423** 8.2712*** 8.2209*** 
 
(2.3682) (2.1711) (2.7597) (2.0486) (2.0944) 
BM 3.3115*** 2.6656*** 1.9614*** 2.5311*** 2.4715*** 
 
(0.5970) (0.6659) (0.7395) (0.6683) (0.6990) 
Liquidity –0.1586*** –0.0993** –0.0541 –0.0997** –0.0968* 
 
(0.0611) (0.0474) (0.0692) (0.0480) (0.0496) 
Risk 4.2563*** 3.7961*** 3.4255** 3.6269*** 3.6423*** 
 
(1.1802) (1.0185) (1.7322) (1.0187) (1.0283) 
Analyst 0.3505 –0.8295** –0.9606** –0.7273* –0.8231* 
 
(0.4889) (0.4150) (0.4701) (0.4124) (0.4348) 
Bias 0.0224** 0.0253*** 0.4747 0.0248*** 0.0249** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0094) (0.5469) (0.0093) (0.0098) 
FInstitution –5.1454*** 8.4570* –17.336 –3.3821 –0.5725 
 
(1.6260) (4.3977) (19.3478) (6.4262) (2.6782) 
Duality –0.7674     
 
(0.9124)     Duality × FInstitution –5.9723**     
 
(2.5166)     BInd  6.8719
***   
  
(2.5093)    BInd × FInstitution  –25.7564
***   
  
(9.0506)    BActive   –0.1114   
   
(0.0967)   BActive × FInstitution   0.148   
   
(0.2047)   BSize    0.2442  
    
(0.1957)   
(continued on next page) 
 
 Stock Market Liberalisation and Cost of Equity  
37 
 
 
Table 6: (continued) 
 
 
Duality Independence Activeness Size Experience 
BSize × FInstitution    –0.0336  
    
(0.6812)  BExp     0.0154 
     
(0.0187) 
BExp × FInstitution     –0.0498 
     
(0.0524) 
N 272 359 236 359 350 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2959 0.2732 0.2756 0.2662 0.2604 
 
Notes: The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in Table 2. The dependent variable is cost of 
equity (KOJ). Year dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. Figures in parentheses 
are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Motivated by the bold liberalisation measures undertaken by the Malaysian 
government in the 2000s, this study evaluates the effect of stock market 
liberalisation on the cost of equity capital for public listed firms on Bursa 
Malaysia. Unlike previous studies that use stock market liberalisation indicators 
at the aggregate level, we use foreign ownership at the firm-level to capture the 
actual presence of foreign investors across different firms within the same 
country over time. Even though our literature survey is unable to find published 
study that examines the direct link between foreign ownership and cost of equity, 
we hypothesise a lower cost of equity attributable to foreign participation through 
the channels of strong corporate governance and higher stock liquidity.  
 
 Capitalising on the recently assembled ownership dataset 'End of Year 
Shareholdings by Type of Investor' by Bursa Malaysia, we find strong empirical 
support for all our three hypotheses. First, the key variable of total foreign 
ownership is negatively and significantly associated with cost of equity. Such 
benefit of foreign participation can be driven by their influences on corporate 
governance or stock liquidity. Second, when we decompose total foreign 
ownership into foreign institutions, foreign individuals and foreign nominees, we 
find that only the first type of foreign investors is significantly associated with 
lower cost of equity. This favours the corporate governance channel because 
foreign institutions have the expertise and resources to monitor management, 
which leads to lower agency risk, higher financial reporting quality and improved 
corporate governance. Third, we find that an effective board of directors further 
strengthens the negative relationship between foreign institutions and cost of 
equity, lending support to the corporate governance channel.  
 
Swee-Sim Foong and Kian-Ping Lim 
38 
 Our results further complement Lim et al. (2015, 2016) in that all three 
Malaysian studies point to significant benefits from foreign participation in terms 
of greater stock price efficiency, higher stock liquidity and lower cost of equity. 
While there are growing empirical support for the Malaysian government 
liberalization policy, the policy challenge lies not merely on removing statutory 
investment restrictions. Instead, regulators should devise measures to attract the 
right types of foreign investors to participate in the Malaysian stock market. At 
the micro-level, our results suggest that firms can influence their cost of equity by 
attracting more foreign institutional investors. Furthermore, firms that strive to 
enforce stronger corporate governance should leverage on the participation of 
foreign institutions, as the benefit of lower cost of equity is larger. Researchers 
can provide useful input in this aspect, for instance, by exploring the stock 
preferences of each foreign investor group.  
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